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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4131 
___________ 
 
MUTTAQIN FATIR ABDULLAH, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LT. SEBA; GEORGE, Medical Staff; PRINCE, Nurse 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-01227) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 1, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed July 20, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Muttaqin Abdullah appeals the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the defendants.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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exercise a plenary standard of review.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro 
Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  For the reasons detailed below, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Abdullah is an inmate confined in USP-Lewisburg.  In May 2012, he filed an 
action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971), naming as defendants a corrections officer and two members of the prison’s 
medical staff.  The claims concern an incident in April 2011 in which he was placed in 
ambulatory restraints for 24 hours.  He alleged that the restraints were too tight and 
caused injuries to his hands and wrists.  He raised two Eighth Amendment claims: (1) 
that placing him in restraints for this significant length of time amounted to cruel and 
unusual punishment, and (2) that he was provided with inadequate medical care. 
 The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants.1  The Court 
concluded that (a) “the duration of this period of restraint — 24 hours —simply does not 
implicate grave Eighth Amendment concerns,” Op. at 30; (b) the use of this restraint 
represented an appropriate response to Abdullah’s threatening behavior; (c) medical 
personnel monitored Abdullah and “observed no medical reason to remove these 
                                              
1 The District Court concluded that all of the Defendants’ factual claims could be treated 
as admitted because Abdullah failed to file a separate statement of the material disputed 
facts remaining for trial as required by Middle District Local Rule 56.1.  While district 
courts may properly use their local rules to narrow the issues for trial, see Anchorage 
Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175-76 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1990), whether 
such rules may be applied to pro se litigants, particularly those who make a substantial 
attempt to comply, is a separate question that we have not yet addressed.  We need not do 
so today because, even taking his factual allegations into account, Abdullah has failed to 
establish a genuine dispute of material fact. 
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restraints,” id. at 32; (d) Abdullah had manipulated the handcuffs, which caused his hand 
to swell; and (e) a doctor stated that, while Abdullah later received surgery for a nerve 
injury near his elbow, that injury was not caused by the handcuffs.  The Court likewise 
concluded that medical personnel had provided appropriate care to Abdullah.  Finally, the 
Court ruled that, even if Abdullah had presented a viable claim, the defendants were 
protected by qualified immunity.2 
We agree with the District Court’s analysis of this case.  We turn first to 
Abdullah’s excessive-force claim.  The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials 
from unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain in a manner that offends contemporary 
standards of decency.  See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).  When reviewing 
Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims, the Court must determine whether the “force 
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm.”  Id. at 7.  “‘Application of force by prison guards exceeding 
that which is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances’ may be actionable.”  
Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2015) (alterations omitted) (quoting 
Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 827 (3d Cir. 1984)).  
                                              
2 The District Court also denied Abdullah’s sundry requests to amend or supplement his 
complaint.  He has not challenged this decision on appeal, and we therefore will not 
review it.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well 
settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief 
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”); see also Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 
874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants 
liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned[.]” 
(internal citation omitted)).   
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The undisputed evidence here reveals that the defendants placed Abdullah in 
restraints after he threatened to assault staff.  He was kept in restraints for 24 hours 
because he continued to be disruptive and stated that he would not be compliant if he was 
released.  During this period, he was checked every two hours by prison officers and 
every four hours by medical personnel; during these checks, Abdullah offered no medical 
complaints.  While restrained, Abdullah refused to cooperate with the staff’s requests to 
move his extremities — which would prevent circulation problems — and instead, 
against the advice of stuff, manipulated the handcuffs in a way that harmed his wrists.   
In these circumstances, we agree with the District Court that a reasonable jury 
could not find that the defendants used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm.”  Young, 801 F.3d at 180 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312, 320-21 (1986)).  Moreover, while Abdullah has made various allegations about the 
defendants’ purported misconduct, he has not produced sufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment.  See Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“In this respect, summary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up’ time for the 
non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record 
and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral 
argument.”); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment”). 
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 Likewise, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment on Abdullah’s claim concerning the medical care he 
received both while he was restrained and after he was released.  To state a viable Eighth 
Amendment claim, Abdullah was required to show that the defendants were deliberately 
indifferent to a serious medical need.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  
“To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a 
substantial risk of serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009).  
As the District Court explained, the undisputed evidence reveals that Abdullah received 
thorough and regular treatment for his various ailments, which culminated in successful 
surgery in October 2011.  While he is apparently unsatisfied with the care he received, 
his vague complaints fail to show that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated.  See 
generally Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that “mere 
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” is insufficient to state a constitutional 
violation (alteration omitted) (quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. 
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.     
 
